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Potential gameAbstract Multi-agent cooperation problems are becoming more and more attractive in both civil-
ian and military applications. In multi-agent cooperation problems, different network topologies
will decide different manners of cooperation between agents. A centralized system will directly
control the operation of each agent with information ﬂow from a single centre, while in a distrib-
uted system, agents operate separately under certain communication protocols. In this paper, a sys-
tematic distributed optimization approach will be established based on a learning game algorithm.
The convergence of the algorithm will be proven under the game theory framework. Two typical
consensus problems will be analyzed with the proposed algorithm. The contributions of this work
are threefold. First, the designed algorithm inherits the properties in learning game theory for
problem simpliﬁcation and proof of convergence. Second, the behaviour of learning endows the
algorithm with robustness and autonomy. Third, with the proposed algorithm, the consensus
problems will be analyzed from a novel perspective.
ª 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of CSAA & BUAA.1. Introduction
Multi-agent cooperation problems are becoming more and
more attractive in both civilian and military applications, such
as the real-time monitoring of crops status, monitoring the
trafﬁc situation,1,2 forest ﬁre monitoring,3,4 surveillance5–7
and battle ﬁeld assessment.8 In multi-agent cooperationproblems, different network topologies will inﬂuence different
manners of cooperation between agents. A centralized system
will directly control the operation of each agent with informa-
tion ﬂow from a single centre, while in a distributed system,
agents operate separately under certain communication
protocols.
There are many related studies on distributed multi-agent
cooperation problems such as ﬂocks,9 swarms,10,11 sensor
fusion12,13 and so on. The theoretical framework for construct-
ing and solving consensus problems within networked systems
was introduced in Refs. 14–17.
For distributed multi-agent systems, there are three chal-
lenges need to be addressed to achieve cooperation among a
potentially large number of involving agents:
192 Z. Lin, H.hong-tao Liu(1) Limited information for agents to utilize to achieve the
global objective.
(2) The information of the distributed network topology is
unknown to agents.
(3) The network can be dynamic, such as stochastic net-
works or switching networks.
To construct a game theory model for a distributed multi-
agent cooperation problem: ﬁrst, the agents of the game and
their strategy domains needs to be identiﬁed, in which agents
are considered as myopic and rational players; second, based
on the strategy domains and the mission requirement, a global
cost function that reﬂects the performance of the joint actions
will be constructed; third, an optimal strategy will be derived
out based on the established global cost function. Therefore,
in order to achieve cooperation in a distributed network
among myopic agents, the designed game will yield the lowest
costs for all agents if and only if when their strategies will ben-
eﬁt the global objective.
Based on bargaining game concept, the author suggests a
useful strategy for task assignment and resource distribution
problems with a small number of agents.18 An approach is pro-
posed for consensus problems based on cooperative game the-
ory and bargain game theory.19 A distributed optimization
algorithm is designed based on the state potential game
framework.20,21
In classical game theory, agents are assumed to be able
to correctly anticipate what their opponents will do. It
may be unrealistic in practice. In real application, agents
cannot introspectively anticipate how others will act in dis-
tributed networks, especially in games with a large number
of participants. Unlike classical game theory, learning game
theory does not impose assumptions on agents’ rationality
and believes, but assumes instead that agents can learn over
time about the game and the behaviour patterns of their
opponents.
The preliminary result was presented.22 In this paper, a sys-
tematic distributed optimization approach will be established
based on a learning game algorithm. The convergence of the
algorithm will be proven under game theory framework.
Two typical consensus problems will be analyzed with the pro-
posed algorithm.2. Preliminaries
For a game GðN; ðU i; i 2 NÞ; ðJi; i 2 NÞÞ, U i represents agent i’s
strategy domain with its element as li. The collected strategy
domain of U i is denoted as U ¼ i2NU i with its element as
l ¼ ðli; liÞ, where li denotes the strategies of other agents
besides agent i. The cost function for agent i is denoted as
Jiðli; liÞ, which implies that agent i’s cost depends both on
its own strategy and on every other agent’s strategy.2.1. Governing equation
Fictitious play algorithm is adopted for designing the distrib-
uted optimization algorithm in this work. It is a variant of a
‘‘stationary Bayesian learning’’ process. In ﬁctitious play,
agents assume behaviour patterns of their competitors were
stationary.22Consider a 2 · 2 matrix game
ð1Þ
where aij ði ¼ 1; 2; j ¼ 1; 2Þ represents the cost of Agent 1
according to its strategies fl11; l21g and bij ði ¼ 1; 2; j ¼ 1; 2Þ is
the cost of Agent 2 for its strategies fl12; l22g. Agents will decide
their strategies based on their current empirical frequency for
their opponents. The algorithm starts with an initial empirical
frequency
e21ð0Þ ¼ ðw21;w22Þ
e12ð0Þ ¼ ðw11;w12Þ

ð2Þ
where wji ði ¼ 1; 2; j ¼ 1; 2Þ represents the anticipated weight
for opponent j’s ith strategy.
Take Agent 1 as an example, according the empirical fre-
quency of Agent 1, the cost for each strategy is
J1ðl11je21Þ ¼
w21a11 þ w22a12
w21 þ w22
J1ðl21je21Þ ¼
w21a21 þ w22a22
w21 þ w22
8>><
>>:
ð3Þ
Both agents will choose the strategies that yields the lowest
cost based on their own empirical frequencies. At the end of
each game, agents will update their empirical frequency
according to their opponents’ strategies in the previous game.
Deﬁnition 1. (e-dominate23). A strategy li 2 U i is e-dominated
by another strategy l^i 2 U i, if for any li 2 Ui, there exists
Jiðli; liÞ > Jiðl^i; liÞ þ e. The set of e-dominate strategy
domain of agent i is denoted as
Dei ðUÞ ¼ fli 2 U ijJiðli; liÞ þ e 6 Jiðl^i; liÞ;
8l^i 2 U i; 8li 2 Ui; eP 0g ð4Þ
According to the deﬁnition of the e-dominate domain, an
adaptive learning is deﬁned as
Deﬁnition 2. (Adaptive learning23). A sequence of strategy for
agent i as fliðtÞg is consistent with adaptive learning, if
liðtÞ 2 Dei ðflðsÞjt^ 6 s < tgÞ; 8t^ < t ð5Þ
Deﬁnition 3. (Nash equilibrium). A strategy l ¼ ðli ; liÞ is
called a Nash Equilibrium of game GðN; fU i; i 2 Ng;
fJi; i 2 NgÞ, if and only if
Jiðli ; liÞ 6 Jiðli; liÞ; 8i 2 N; 8li 2 U i ð6Þ
Deﬁnition 4. (Convergence). The sequence ffðtÞg converges to
f if and only if there is a T > 0 such that fðtÞ ¼ f for all tP T.
Lemma 1. (Adaptive learning convergence23). If certain
strategy sequence fliðtÞg is consistent with adaptive learning
and it converges to li , then l

i belongs to a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium l ¼ ðli ; liÞ.
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The potential game concept is important for distributed multi-
agent cooperation problems.
Deﬁnition 5. (Potential game24). A game GðN; fU i; i 2 Ng;
fJi; i 2 NgÞ is a potential game if there exists a global function
Uðli; liÞ such that
Jiðli; liÞ  Jiðl^i; liÞ ¼ Uðli; liÞ  Uðl^i; liÞ;
8i 2 N; li; l^i 2 U i; li 2 Ui ð7Þ
If the strategy domain for every agent of a potential game is
bounded, this game is deﬁned as a bounded potential game.
The potential game concept provides a valuable theoretical
framework for distributed multi-agent cooperation problems.
First, a game admits the potential property is guaranteed to
possess a Nash equilibrium. Second, from the deﬁnition of a
potential game, the Nash equilibrium for every local cost func-
tion is consistent with the global objective. The potential game
framework, therefore, provides distributed optimization prob-
lems with theoretical support for problem simpliﬁcation.
Many design methodologies25–27 can be adopted to derive a
potential game according to the global objective.
2.3. Continuous and discrete consensus algorithm
The interaction topology of a network can be denoted as
GðN; EÞ with the set of agents N and edges E. The set of the
neighbours of agent i is denoted as Ni ¼ fj 2 Njði; jÞ 2 Eg.
An adjacent matrix A ¼ ½aij 2 Rnn is deﬁned as
aij > 0 If ði; jÞ 2 E
aij ¼ 0 Otherwise

The Laplacian matrix L ¼ ½lij 2 Rnn is deﬁned as that
lii ¼
Pn
j¼1aij and lij ¼ aij if i–j.
Deﬁnition 6. (Stochastic matrix). A nonnegative square
matrix is a row stochastic matrix if its every row is summed
up to one.28,29
The product of two stochastic matrices is still a stochastic
matrix. A row stochastic matrix P 2 Rnn is a stochastic inde-
composable and aperiodic (SIA) matrix, if limk!1P
k ¼ 1yT
with y 2 Rnn.
The continuous-time consensus algorithm for single inte-
grator system is described as
_xiðtÞ ¼
X
j2Ni
aijðtÞðxjðtÞ  xiðtÞÞ ð8Þ
Its Laplacian matrix form is represented as
_xðtÞ ¼ LðtÞxðtÞ ð9Þ
The consensus algorithm in Eqs. (8) and (9) is for a single-
integrator system with dynamics as _xi ¼ ui. From Eq. (9), the
discrete consensus control law is derived as
xðkþ 1Þ  xðkÞ ¼ LðkÞxðkÞ
xðkþ 1Þ ¼ ð1 LðkÞÞxðkÞ ¼ AðkÞxðkÞ
xiðkþ 1Þ ¼
X
j2Ni
aijðkÞxjðkÞ
8><
>: ð10ÞThe matrix A(k) is row stochastic matrix, which suggests
that
lim
t!1
eLt ¼ 1vT ð11Þ
and
lim
k!1
Ak ¼ 1uT ð12Þ
where
P
ivi ¼ 1 and
P
iui ¼ 1. Therefore, Eqs. (11) and (12)
suggest that limt!1xðtÞ ¼
P
ivixið0Þ and limt!1xðkÞ ¼P
iuixið1Þ .
3. Distributed optimization algorithm
Under a centralized network, the centre can obtain informa-
tion from all agents and conduct the optimization. For a dis-
tributed system, only partial information is available for
each agent due to the distributed network topology.
According to the mission requirement of a distributed
multi-agent cooperation problem, the global cost function is
deﬁned as
Jgðx1; x2; . . . ; xnÞ ð13Þ
and the optimization purpose of this problem is to ﬁnd optimal
fxi ; i 2 Ng that satisﬁes
xi ¼ arg max
xi2U i
Jgðx1; x2; . . . ; xnÞ; i 2 N ð14Þ
In a distributed system, the only information available for
agent i is its own local state xi and the information from its
neighbours fxj; j 2 Nig. A distributed optimization algo-
rithm, therefore, aims at designing a protocol under a distrib-
uted network to achieve an asymptotic convergence of the
state of each agent fxiðkÞ; i 2 Ng according to the global
objective in Eq. (13).
3.1. Distributed optimization algorithm based on ﬁctitious play
concept
In order to adopt and extend the ﬁctitious play concept to
establish a distributed optimization approach, ﬁrst, the empir-
ical frequency will be extended to the continuous domain. Sec-
ond, based on the global objective and local empirical
frequency, a local strategy evaluation function for agent i will
be established. Third, an optimal strategy for agent i will then
be decided for next iteration process.
3.1.1. Empirical frequency
In order to adopt the ﬁctitious play concept for a continuous
distributed problem, a distribution function is adopted to
model the empirical frequency build up by each agent for its
counterparts.
Consider the strategy domain U i for every agent i is contin-
uous and convex. Agent i will model the strategy adopted by
its opponent j at time k as a Gaussian distribution
ljðkÞ ¼ fðujðkÞ; r2j ðkÞÞ  NðujðkÞ; r2j ðkÞÞ. The empirical fre-
quency of agent i for its counterpart j at time k is deﬁned as
ejiðkÞ. If the strategy agent j plays in time k+ 1 isljðkþ 1Þ ¼ fðujðkþ 1Þ; r2j ðkþ 1ÞÞ
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ejiðkþ 1Þ ¼
1
2
ðejiðkÞ þ ljðkþ 1ÞÞ
 Nðui;jðkþ 1Þ; r2i;jðkþ 1ÞÞ ð15Þ
with
ui;jðkþ 1Þ ¼ 1
2
ðui;jðkÞ þ ujðkþ 1ÞÞ
r2i;jðkþ 1Þ ¼
1
4
ðr2i;jðkÞ þ r2j ðkþ 1ÞÞ
8><
>:
and the distribution function for ejiðkÞ is denoted as fiðljðkÞÞ.
Every agent i 2 N will establish its local empirical frequency
at time k for all its opponents as eiðkÞ ¼ fejiðkÞ; j 2 Nig. Dur-
ing each game, agent i will not only share state information but
also empirical frequency with its neighbours and update with
the protocol given in Eq. (15).
3.1.2. Optimization
Based on the updating and sharing protocols for the empirical
frequency, the cost for strategy li 2 U i under empirical fre-
quency ejiðkÞ is calculated by
JjiðlijejiðkÞÞ ¼
Z
Jjiðli; ljÞfiðljðkÞÞdlj ð16Þ
for a two agents game problem.
For the distributed optimization problem as suggested in
Eq. (13), agent i will establish its empirical frequency for all
its opponents as eiðkÞ ¼ ffiðl1ðkÞÞ; . . . ; fiðli1ðkÞÞ;
fiðliþ1ðkÞÞ; . . . ; fiðlnðkÞÞg. Under the empirical frequency
eiðkÞ, the cost for state xi is derived as
JiðxijeiðkÞÞ ¼
Z
. . .
Z
Jgðx1;x2; . . . ;xnÞfiðl1ðkÞÞ . . . fiðli1ðkÞÞ
fiðliþ1ðkÞÞ . . . fiðlnðkÞÞ dx1dx2 . . .dxi1dxiþ1 . . .dxn
ð17Þ
with xi 2 U i.
In every game, agent i will always search for the strategy
xi 2 U i that yields the lowest cost for Eq. (17) under current
empirical frequency as
Jiðxi jeiðkÞÞ 6 Jiðx^ijeiðkÞÞ; 8x^i 2 U i ð18Þ
and update xiðkþ 1Þ ¼ xi .
The cost function JiðlijeiðkÞÞ for strategy li under the local
empirical frequency eiðkÞ is different from the local cost func-
tion Jiðli; liÞ as discussed in Eq. (7). The empirical frequency
based cost function JiðlijeiðkÞÞ is a constructed function based
on the local empirical frequency eiðkÞ and the global cost func-
tion Jgðx1; x2; . . . ; xnÞ, while the local cost function Jiðli; liÞ is
a predeﬁned function based on the current strategies from
agents which are accessible to agent i under a certain network
topology. In this sense, without information from others, the
local cost function cannot be veriﬁed, while agent i can still
make decision based on its empirical frequency and JiðlijeiðkÞÞ.
3.2. Convergence analysis and remarks
Deﬁnition 2 suggests that for every iteration, if agent i’s strat-
egy is selected from the e dominate strategy domain, this
algorithm is consistent with adaptive learning procedure. For
the distributed optimization algorithm introduced in the previ-ous section, the proposed algorithm suggests that agents will
always adopt strategies that yield lowest cost based on their
current empirical frequency. In this sense, the proposed dis-
tributed optimization algorithm is an adaptive learning pro-
cess. According to Lemma 1, the sequence of state for each
agent fxiðkÞ; i 2 Ng follows the proposed distributed optimi-
zation algorithm will converge to a pure Nash equilibrium x
provided that the distributed problem Eq. (14) exists one.
Remark 1. From the updating protocol as deﬁned in Eq. (15),
the memory size mji of e
j
iðkÞ is deﬁned as that agent i will only
record the most recent mji strategies of its opponent j as
fljðkmji þ 1Þ; . . . ; ljðk 1Þ; ljðkÞg.
Remark 2. Since agents in learning game theory have no prior
knowledge concerning their opponents, both the empirical fre-
quency and strategies concerning their opponents are modelled
as Gaussian distribution on ð1;þ1Þ.4. Application to consensus problems
In this section, the theoretical developments proposed in previ-
ous sections will be illustrated with two typical consensus
problems. Based on the problem requirements, the two prob-
lems will ﬁrstly be modelled as distributed optimization prob-
lems and the proposed algorithm will be adopted for solving
them. The ﬁrst problem is a distributed averaging problem
and the second problem is a rendezvous problem, and in
which, every agent is modelled as a UAV with unicycle model.
The simulation result concerning the two problems will be pre-
sented and discussed in the next section.
4.1. Distributed averaging problem
Consider there exist n agents with their initial states are not
equal to each other and the sum of their states equals to
l> 0. The state domain for each agent is continuous, convex
and bounded as U i ¼ ð0; l; 8i 2 N. The inter-agent connec-
tion is distributed, i.e. the network topology is not a full graph.
The mission requirement is to design a distributed protocol to
let the state of every agent reach a consensus. For this typical
consensus problem, the global cost function is designed as
Jgðx1; x2; . . . ; xnÞ ¼
X
i–j
aijðxi  xjÞ2
ði; j 2 N; aij P 0Þ
ð19Þ
where xi and xj represent the states of agent i and agent j,
respectively. By analyzing the cost function, the only equilib-
rium is achieved when xi ¼ xj; 8i; j 2 N.
Based on the problem requirement, the local cost function
can be designed as
Jiðxi; xiÞ ¼
X
j2Ni
aijðxi  xjÞ2 ð20Þ
with the neighbour set for each agent is deﬁned based on the
distributed and connected network topology.
From the deﬁnition of the local cost function, the designed
game is a bounded potential game24 with its potential function
as the global cost function Eq. (19). According to the proper-
ties of a potential game, the designed game is guaranteed to
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function Eq. (20) is consistent the global objective Eq. (19).
Provided that the empirical frequency ejiðkÞ is deﬁned as a
Gaussian process as fiðljðkÞÞ  Nðui;jðkÞ; r2i;jðkÞÞ, the cost for
a strategy xi 2 U i is
JiðxijeiÞ ¼
Z
. . .
Z X
j2Ni
aijðxi  xjÞ2fiðl1Þfiðl2Þ . . . fiðli1Þfiðliþ1Þ
. . . fiðlnÞdx1dx2 . . . dxi1dxiþ1 . . . dxn
¼
X
j2Ni
Z
aijðxi  xjÞ2fiðljÞdxj
¼
X
j2Ni
aijðu2i;j þ r2i;j  2xiui;j þ x2i Þ ð21Þ
where the time k is ignored for concision.
Because of the assumption of myopic for agents and the
convexity of the local cost function, the optimal strategy xi
for agent i based on its empirical frequency is derived from
@JiðxijeiÞ
@xi
¼ @
@xi
X
j2Ni
aijðu2i;j þ r2i;j  2xiui;j þ x2i Þ
¼
X
j2Ni
2aijðxi  ui;jÞ ¼ 0 ð22Þ
Therefore,
xi ¼
X
j2Ni
aijui;jX
j2Ni
aij
ð23Þ
which is the weighted average of the mean values of agent i’s
empirical frequency.
Further, if the weight aij admits
P
j2Niaij ¼ 1 and the mem-
ory size for agent i’s empirical frequency equals 1, which
implies fiðljðkÞÞ ¼ fðxjðkÞ; r2j ðkÞÞ, then
xiðkþ 1Þ ¼
X
j2Ni
aijxjðkÞ ð24Þ
which is consistent with the discrete consensus protocol.3
Lemma 2. Every bounded potential game has approximate ﬁnite
improvement property (AFIP).24
Theorem 1. The algorithm proposed in this section will converge
with ﬁnite iteration steps for the consensus problem as suggested
in Eq. (19) and will only converge to the consensus state as
f ¼ fxi ; i 2 Ng : x1 ¼ x2 ¼ x3 ¼ . . . ¼ xn ð25Þ
Proof. The proof of this theorem is based on the proof of the
following two statements:
(1) The sequence of this algorithm will converge with ﬁnite
iteration steps
(2) If the algorithm converges, it will only converge to the
consensus state as suggested in Eq. (25).
[Proof of Convergence I] As discussed in Section 3.2 and
Lemma 2, with the proposed distributed optimization algo-
rithm, the problem will converge with ﬁnite iteration steps.
[Proof of Convergence II] Assume the algorithm will converge
to certain state f and f–f, where f is the equilibrium state assuggested in Eq. (25). Since the network topology in this
problem is distributed and connected, there must exist agent
j 2 Ni such that
xi–xj; xi 2 f and xj 2 f ð26Þ
Since f is the state of convergence, according to the empir-
ical frequency updating protocol and Deﬁnition 4, the empiri-
cal frequency for agent i and agent j will be
lim
k!1
ejiðkÞ ¼ fðxj; r2j Þ ð27Þ
lim
k!1
eijðkÞ ¼ fðxi; r2i Þ ð28Þ
Therefore, according to Eq. (23), the new updating process is
x0i ¼ xj
x0j ¼ xi
(
ð29Þ
Since xi–xj the updated state f
0 ¼ fx01; x02; . . . ; x0ng is not
equal to f, according to the deﬁnition of convergence as
Deﬁnition 4, the assumption does not hold. Therefore, if the
algorithm converges, it will only converge to the consensus
state as Eq. (25). h4.2. Rendezvous problem for UAVs
A rendezvous problem is a typical multi-agent cooperation
problem. For a rendezvous mission, multiple agents are usu-
ally required to arrive a rendezvous point through communica-
tion with each other under a distributed network topology. A
rendezvous problem can be related to various application
domain. The authors30–32 considered the planning of threat-
avoiding trajectories for agents for a rendezvous mission in a
hostile environment. In this section, without further compli-
cated the discussion, a simple rendezvous problem will be con-
sidered and the problem will be handled with the proposed
distributed optimization algorithm as discussed in previous
sections.
Assume there are n agents located randomly on a 2-dimen-
sioal (2D) plane, and the inter-agent communication is undi-
rected and distributed. Each agent i can only communicate
with its neighbour j 2 Ni. The model for each agent follows
the deﬁnition of a unicycle model as
_xi ¼ V cos hi
_yi ¼ V sin hi
_hi ¼ xi
8><
>: ð30Þ
where V is the constant speed for every agent and xi is the con-
trol input.
The rendezvous problem requires agents to gather to the
same location on the 2D plane. The controllers for agents are
designed based on their own empirical frequency. The rendez-
vous mission does not require UAVs arrive the same location
at the same time. The inter-UAV communication happens on
a predeﬁned time interval, and vehicles will re-adjust their con-
trol inputs whenever information update is available. For this
rendezvous problem, the global cost function is designed as
Jgðl1; l2; . . . ; lnÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
Jiðli; liÞ ð31Þ
Table 1 Simulation results for the distributed averaging
problem.
Number of
neighbours
Inﬁnite
memory size
Memory
size 3
Memory
size 2
3 470 395 306
5 152 128 96
7 66 58 39
10 38 45 19
15 13 23 15
196 Z. Lin, H.hong-tao Liuwith
Jiðli; liÞ ¼
X
j2Ni
ðxi  xjÞ2 þ ðyi  yjÞ2
h i
where li ¼ ðxi; yi; hiÞ is the state of agent i.
Based on the discussion of the distributed optimization
algorithm in previous sections, each agent i will establish its
local empirical frequency ei ¼ fe1i ; e2i ; . . . ; eni g based on the
information from its neighbours. Each entry of the empirical
frequency e ji is the estimation for the state of another agent,
i.e. e ji ¼ ðe jix; e jiy; e jihÞ with both e jix; e jiy and e jih are Gaussian pro-
cess as fixðljÞ  Nðuix;j; r2ix;jÞ; fiyðljÞ  Nðuiy;j; r2iy;jÞ and
fihðljÞ  Nðuih; j; r2ih;jÞ, respectively. For a strategy
li ¼ ðxi; yi; hiÞ 2 U i, since the global cost function only
involves the state of fxj; j 2 Nig and fyj; j 2 Nig, the cost of
the strategy based on the local empirical frequency is
JiðlijeiÞ ¼
Z
. . .
Z
Jgðl1; l2; . . . ; lnÞfixðl1Þ
 fiyðl1Þ . . . fixðlnÞfiyðlnÞdl1 . . . dln ð32Þ
By analyzing Jgðl1; l2; . . . ; lnÞ and fJiðli; liÞ; i 2 Ng in
Eq. (31), the designed problem is consistent with a potential
game as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5, and thus, the equilibrium
for fJiðli; liÞ; i 2 Ng is consistent with the global objective.
Therefore, the cost function for the strategy li of agent i can
be simpliﬁed as
JiðlijeiÞ ¼
Z
. . .
Z
Jiðxi;yiÞfixðl1Þfiyðl1Þ . . . fixðlnÞfiyðlnÞdl1 . . .dln
¼
X
j2Ni
ðu2ix;jþr2ix;j 2uix;jxiþx2i Þ
þ
X
j2Ni
ðu2iy;jþr2iy;j 2uiy;jyiþ y2i Þ ¼Wiðxi;yiÞ ð33Þ
With the support of Eq. (33), the optimal control problem is
design as
Ji ¼ WiðxiðtfÞ; yiðtfÞÞ þ
Z tf
0
1
2
rx2i dt
s:t:
_xi ¼ V cos hi
_yi ¼ V sin hi
_h ¼ xi
8><
>: ð34Þ
By solving this optimal control problem, the control input
and the trajectory for each agent can be obtained for the ren-
dezvous mission.
5. Simulation results
In this section, based on the analysis of the two consensus
problems in the previous section, corresponding simulations
are conducted to illustrate the theoretical developments.
5.1. Simulation for distributed averaging problem
The simulation for the distributed averaging problem is con-
ducted to illustrate the inﬂuence of neighbour numbers and
memory size on convergence efﬁciency. The number of neigh-
bours for each agent is the same. The weights aij are constant
and equal to each other. Every agent can only communicatewith its most adjacent agents. The updating protocol adopted
in the simulation follows Eq. (15) with the variance values for
distribution functions equal 0.
Table 1 and Fig. 1(a) demonstrate the inﬂuence of number
of neighbours on the algorithm convergence rate. The memory
size in this case is inﬁnite, which implies that each agent will
record the whole strategy proﬁle for its counterparts.
From the simulation results, it is apparent that the conver-
gence efﬁciency will increase if the number of neighbours for
each agent is increased, which is coherent with the fundamen-
tal consensus theory.33
Table 1 and Fig. 1(b) demonstrate the inﬂuence of memory
of the empirical frequency on the algorithm convergence rate.
In Table 1, the column ‘‘Inﬁnite memory size’’ represents the
case that agents will take all strategies adopted by their coun-
terparts into consideration to make their own decision, while
‘‘Memory size 2’’ and ‘‘Memory size 3’’ columns represent
agents will only use the most recent 2 or 3 information to esti-
mate their opponents’ strategy patterns.
In order to make the simulation result more clear for dem-
onstration, the information updating process for only one
agent is demonstrated in Fig. 1(b). The blue line represents
the inﬁnite memory case; the red line represents the case in
which the memory size of the empirical frequency equals 2;
the green line represents the memory size 3 case.
The result demonstrates that for the network that each
agent has less neighbours, the decrease of memory size will
improve the performance greatly. However, under network
topologies that each agent has more neighbours, there is no
clear pattern to describe the inﬂuence of memory on the per-
formance of convergence.
5.2. Simulation for rendezvous problem with multiple UAVs
The simulation for the rendezvous problem is conducted to
demonstrate the designing procedure of a distributed multi-
agent cooperation mission based on the distributed optimiza-
tion algorithm proposed before. In the simulation, 5 unicycle
model based vehicles are considered with constant velocity
V= 10 m/s. The vehicles are distributed on the 2D plane at
points [1 km, 3 km], [3 km, 7 km], [9 km, 10 km], [10 km,
4 km] and [6 km, 2 km].
In this problem, the inter-vehicle collision and obstacle
avoidance are not considered for simplicity. The inter-vehicle
communication is distributed, and each vehicle can only com-
municate with its 2 most adjacent neighbours under an undi-
rected network topology. The communication is assumed to
happen every 10 s after the mission start, and communication
Fig. 1 Simulation for distributed averaging problem.
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when the global cost is smaller than a predeﬁned threshold
T, and in the simulation, the threshold is set as T= 0.1. The
general pseudo-spectral optimization software (GPOPS)34 is
adopted for the optimal control problem.
The trajectories for the vehicles are demonstrated in
Fig. 2(a), and corresponding global cost function convergence
result with regard to time is illustrated in Fig. 2(b). The conver-Fig. 2 Simulation results of trajectorgence of the state x and y for each vehicle are demonstrated in
Fig. 3(a) and (b) separately. Fig. 4(a) shows the simulation
result of the state h. The designed controller signal is as
demonstrated in Fig. 4(b).
The simulation demonstrates that the designed controller
based on the distributed optimization algorithm proposed in
the previous section can achieve the rendezvous mission
requirement.y for each vehicle and global cost.
Fig. 4 Simulation results of heading angle h and control signal x.
Fig. 3 Simulation results of states x and y.
198 Z. Lin, H.hong-tao Liu6. Conclusions
(1) A distributed optimization algorithm is designed based
on the ﬁctitious play concept. The algorithm assumes
agents analyze past observations as if behaviours of their
competitors were stationary, and by learning from the
strategy patterns of their opponents, agents will decide
their own optimal strategies.
(2) The designed distributed optimization algorithm ensures
the algorithm autonomy and robustness through the
learning behaviour of each agent.
(3) Convergence of the proposed algorithm is proven under
game theory framework to guarantee the algorithm will
converge to a Nash Equilibrium provided that the origi-
nal problem design exists one.(4) By introducing and analyzing the two typical consensus
problems with the proposed distributed optimization
algorithm, this paper provides a guideline for multi-
agent cooperation problem design under game theory
framework.
(5) Simulation results are provided to demonstrate that the
designed game model for the distributed multi-agent
cooperation problems can ensure global cooperation
among myopic agents.
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